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1 See generally Harl, The Farm Debt
Crisis of the 1980s, Iowa State
University Press, 1990.
2 See 4 Harl, Agricultural Law §
39.03 (1992).
3 Id., § 39.03[3].
4 Bkrpcy. Rule 4004(a), (c).
5 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
6 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a).
7 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
8 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A).
9 Ltr. Rul. 8928012, April 7, 1989.
1 0 I.R.C. § 1398(a) (new entity con-
cept applicable only to Chapter 7
and 11 filers).
1 1 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).  See, e.g.,
Vukasovich, Inc. v. Comm'r, 790
F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'g in
part and rev'g in part, T.C. Memo.
1984-611 (cancellation of indebted-
ness for less than amount owed
resulted in ordinary income to
debtor).
1 2 See Harl, Discharge of Indebtedness,
Insolvent Debtors and Debtors in
Bankruptcy, 1 Agric. L. Dig. 77
(1990). See also 4 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 39.03 (1992).
1 3 I.R.C. § 108(g).
1 4 I.R.C. § 108(g)(3)(D).
1 5 I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2).
1 6 I.R.C. §§ 108(b)(5); 1017(b)(2).
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.1(c).
1 7 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A).
1 8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a).
1 9 See I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
EXEMPTIONS.
AVOIDABLE LIENS. A hospital perfected statutory
liens against the proceeds of an automobile accident
insurance policy received by the debtor resulting from an
automobile accident. The debtor claimed an exemption for
the insurance proceeds and avoidance of the hospital lien as
impairing the exemption. The court held that because the
hospital lien arose purely by act of statute, the lien could
not be avoided and had priority over the debtor's exemption
claim. In re  Pohrman, 146 B.R. 570 (Bankr. D .
Or. 1992).
The debtors sought to avoid a judgment lien against their
homestead which was claimed as an exemption. The
judgment creditor argued that because the debtor had waived
the homestead exemption as to the judgment lien when the
lien attached, the debtor was precluded from claiming the
homestead exemption as to the judgment lien. The court
held that under North Carolina case law, a waiver applied
only to the execution of the judgment lien and that a
bankruptcy filing was treated as a separate execution for
which a separate waiver would have to be filed. Thus, the
judgment lien could be avoided because the debtors had not
waived the homestead exemption in the bankruptcy case. In
re  Pinner, 146 B.R. 659 (Bankr. E.D. N . C .
1992) .
IRA. The debtors’ interests in custodial IRA’s were held
to be exempt under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 110, ¶ 12-1006 where
the IRA’s were established with a good faith intent to
qualify under the Internal Revenue Code. The court also held
that the IRA’s did not need to qualify as spendthrift trusts in
order to be exempt. In re  Templeton, 146 B.R. 7 5 7
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
  CHAPTER 13  
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors’ Chapter 13
plan provided for a 41 percent payment of unsecured
creditors’ claims and provided for personal expenses to
include $614 per month for tuition and rent for a child in
college. A creditor argued that the tuition and rent should be
included in disposable income as excessive and unnecessary
personal expenses. The court held that because the child was
a senior and was attending a low cost state college, the
expenses were necessary and not unreasonable, especially
where the unsecured creditors were receiving 41 percent of
their claims and would receive nothing in a Chapter 7 case.
In re  Riegodedios, 146 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E . D .
Va. 1992).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
CLAIMS. An IRS late-filed claim amendment for over
$2 million in unpaid taxes was denied because the
amendment was significantly different from the original
claim for $11,000.  The court held that the existence of an
ongoing audit of the tax returns for the tax years subject to
the claim did not excuse the IRS for failure to seek ex-
tension of time to file claims.  In re  Stavriotis, 9 7 7
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'g , 129 B.R. 5 2 7
(N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'g , 103 B.R. 1005 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989).
EXCISE TAXES.  The debtor filed for bankruptcy in
July 1986 and the IRS filed claims for 1984, 1985 and 1986
for the excise tax on accumulated funding deficiencies in the
debtor's ERISA plans. The debtor had obtained a waiver for
1984 and was current on payment terms up to the filing for
bankruptcy but stopped making payments after the filing.
No waiver was obtained for 1985 but the bankruptcy filing
occurred before the latest date for which the deficiency could
have been paid without penalty. The 1986 liability occurred
post-petition. The court held that the excise tax for all three
years would not be allowed because the liability arose post-
petition and would violate the automatic stay. For 1984, the
waiver acted as a credit to relieve the deficiency until
payments were not made under the waiver agreement. The
court held that a retroactive provision was invalid as
contrary to statute. In re  Chateaugay Corp., 1 4 6
B.R. 626 (S.D. N.Y. 1992).
JURISDICTION. Under the debtor's plan, an amount
was to be paid to a third party who filed a claim in the case.
The plaintiff had a judgment lien against the property of the
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third party and the IRS had also filed a tax lien against the
third party's property. The plaintiff sought a bankruptcy
court order requiring the plan disbursing agent to make the
plan payment directly to the plaintiff in recognition of the
priority of the plaintiff's lien above the IRS lien. The court
held that the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction over
the controversy because the issues were not related to the
bankruptcy case. In re  North Star Contracting
Corp., 146 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1992).
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The debtor had
prepetition passive activity losses and credits and the estate
creditors sought a determination that the losses and credits
passed to the bankruptcy estate upon the debtor's filing for
bankruptcy. The court held that the losses and credits did not
pass to the bankruptcy estate because the statute, I.R.C. §
1398(g), limited the allowable tax items which could pass
to the estate.  Note: the IRS has now issued proposed
regulations including passive activity losses in the list of
tax items which pass to the bankruptcy estate in Chapters 7
and 11 (see Vol. 3, Agric. L. Dig., p. 191). In re
Antonelli, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 6 1 9
(Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
POST-CONFIRMATION INTEREST. The IRS
had filed a claim which included pre-petition tax and interest.
The claim was disputed and appealed until the U.S. Supreme
court denied certiorari of a ruling allowing the claim. The
debtor’s plan provided payment of all allowed claims on the
later of the plan effective date or the date the claims became
allowed. The IRS argued that because the claim could not be
paid under the plan until the final appeal was exhausted, the
payment of the claim was a deferred payment and the IRS
was entitled to post-confirmation interest under Section
1129(a)(9)(C). The court held that the delay caused by the
appeals did not make the payment deferred where the plan
provided for immediate payment when the claim became
allowed. In re  White Farm Equipment, Co., 1 4 6
B.R. 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
RETURNS . The debtor sought to have the Chapter 7
trustee file a federal income tax return for the estate. The
debtor argued that the estate had substantial discharge of
indebtedness income, income from the sale of the debtor’s
partnership interest and other income. The trustee argued
that only liquidating trustees who sell estate property are
required to file returns for estates. The court held that all
bankruptcy trustees are required to file bankruptcy estate tax
returns if the estate income exceeds the standard deduction
plus the personal exemption. The court held that the trustee
was not required to file a return because the discharge of
indebtedness income was not recognized since the debtor was
insolvent, the sale of the partnership interest was not
approved, and the remaining income totaled less than the
personal exemption plus the standard deduction. In re
Pflug, 146 B.R. 687 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The plaintiffs were seed companies which
grew and sold to seed dealers seed distributed to them by the
defendant. For over five years before 1984, the plaintiffs
were the only marketing companies for the seed under
contracts, written and oral, with the defendant. In 1984,
without notice to the plaintiffs, the defendant started selling
the seed directly to dealers. The plaintiffs sued for breach of
contract and fraud in that their contracts granted them
exclusive rights to sell the defendant’s seed to dealers and
that the defendant entered into the 1984 contracts knowing
that it intended to sell directly to dealers.  The court held
sufficient evidence was shown to demonstrate that a contract
provision stating that the plaintiffs had “no exclusive rights
of any kind” referred only to territorial exclusivity. The
verdict of fraud against the defendant was upheld because the
evidence showed that the defendant entered into new sales
contracts with some plaintiffs and encouraged others to
renew their contracts, after the defendant had decided to sell
directly to dealers. Latham Seed v. Nickerson





BORROWER'S RIGHTS. The FmHA has adopted
as final amendments to the regulations involving servicing
of FmHA loans to borrowers who have filed for bankruptcy.
The amendments add a notice, Exhibit E-1 to Instruction
1955-A, of acceleration of a loan after default of a debtor's
bankruptcy plan. Exhibit E is also amended to clarify that
foreclosure of a secured loan, discharged in bankruptcy but
in default under the bankruptcy loan, is only against the
collateral and not an attempt to collect the liability from the
debtor individually. 57 Fed. Reg. 60084 (Dec. 1 8 ,
1992) .
CATTLE. The APHIS has issued a proposed rule
allowing calves younger than four weeks old to be imported
from Canada without being tested for tuberculosis. 57 Fed.
Reg. 62501 (Dec. 31, 1992).
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. In
August 1986, the plaintiffs had applied for participation in
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The application
was signed by most of the undivided interest owners of the
land involved. The approved application was signed by a
CCC representative in January 1987. Five days later the
USDA announced a bonus payment for first time CRP
applicants who applied in February 1987. The plaintiffs
made new applications for enrollment in the CRP in
February 1987 in hopes of qualifying for the bonus. The
plaintiffs argued that the original contracts were invalid
because not all owners signed the application and the
application was not approved within 30 days. The CCC
ruled that the application did not need to be signed by all
owners and that the 30 day period applied only to the
plaintiffs’ ability to reject the contract. The court held that
the August 1986 contract was valid and that the plaintiffs
did not qualify for the bonus because they were not new
applicants in February 1987. Rochman v. U.S., 2 7
Fed. Cl. 162 (1992).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
amendments to the Corn, Grain Sorghum and Soybean
Endorsements adding required late planting and prevented
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planting provisions. 58 Fed. Reg. 3202 (Jan. 8 ,
1993) .
FARMER-OWNED RESERVE--WHEAT. The
CCC has adopted as final regulations providing that 1992
crop wheat may not be pledged as collateral of FOR loans.
57 Fed. Reg. 62473 (Dec. 31, 1992).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM . The plaintiff's uncle
had died and the decedent's estate placed the decedent's farm
for sale. The plaintiff asked the defendant, a loan officer for a
Federal Land Bank Association (FLBA) whether the plaintiff
could borrow money to purchase the decedent's farm. The
plaintiff did not make any loan application. A third party did
apply for a loan to purchase the farm and privately agreed to
sell the defendant 80 acres. When the sale was submitted to
the probate court for approval, the third party agreed to sell
the plaintiff five acres for use by the decedent's surviving
spouse. The plaintiff sued the district Federal Land Bank
(FLB), the FLBA and the defendant for breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud. The court held that (1) the defendant was not
an agent for the FLB, (2) no fiduciary duty was owed by the
FBLA to the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not make a
loan application, and (3) the defendant was not liable for
fraud because the plaintiff did not rely on any statements
made by the officer to the plaintiff's detriment. As to the
last holding, the court noted that the plaintiff received the
five acres and consented to the sale to the third party.
Anderson v. Boeke, 491 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa C t .
App. 1992).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff
contracted T-cell lymphoma from exposure to a herbicide
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff sued the
defendant herbicide manufacturer for, among other claims,
negligent failure to warn. The defendant argued that the
failure to warn claim was barred by preemption of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act as to
labeling requirements for registered herbicides. The court
held that a state tort action for failure to warn regulated only
the sale and use of herbicides and, therefore, was not
preempted by the FIFRA prohibition of state labeling
requirements. Couture v. Dow Chemical U . S . A . ,
804 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992).
TOBACCO. The ASCS has issued proposed
regulations allowing the construction of tobacco auction
markets as far as five miles from a city or town. 58 Fed.
Reg. 3233 (Jan. 8, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADJUSTED TAXABLE GIFTS. In 1979, the
decedent made a gift of stock which was valued for gift tax
purposes at $20,000 and the resulting gift tax was offset by
the available unified credit. After the decedent died in 1988,
the executor included the claimed value of the gift in the
amount of adjusted taxable gifts. The IRS examiner revalued
the 1979 gift at $300,000 and calculated the gift tax payable
by offsetting $38,000 of unified credit available to the
decedent in 1979. The executor argued that the entire gift tax
which would have been payable (the assessment period for
the gift tax had expired) on the revalued gift should have
been used to reduce the tentative estate tax and the amount
of unified credit actually claimed by the decedent in 1979
should be used to reduce the unified credit against the estate
tax.  The IRS ruled that in determining the "amount of tax
which would have been payable" under I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2),
the entire amount of unified credit available to the donor
must be used to offset the gift tax which would have been
payable on the gift. Ltr. Rul. 9250004, Aug. 2 4 ,
1992 .
DISCLAIMERS.  An irrevocable trust was created in
1917 and terminated in 1979 when the last income
beneficiary died.  The trust property was then to be
distributed to the taxpayer as one of the remainder holders.
The taxpayer/decedent disclaimed the interest in the trust
property within two months after the death of the last
income beneficiary.  The three-judge appellate court held
that the 1917 creation of the trust with the remainder to the
decedent was a taxable transfer, based on Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-1(c)(2). Therefore, under pre-1977 law, the
disclaimer was untimely because not made within a
reasonable time after the taxpayer learned about the
remainder interest, when the taxpayer reached age 21 in
1931. The appellate court, en banc, reversed, holding that
the application of the regulation to a pre-gift tax transfer
was improper; therefore, the 1917 trust was not a taxable
transfer and the decedent’s disclaimer was timely. The court
refused to follow the contrary decision in Ordway v. U.S.,
908 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2916 (1991).   Irvine v. U.S., 1992 WL 381688
(8th Cir. 1992), rev’g on rehearing, 91-2 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,074 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g
1989-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,818 ( D .
Minn. 1989).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations reflecting the
changes made under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
amendments made in 1988 and 1989, as to direct skips
occurring at death with respect to property held in trust. The
proposed regulations amend Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2662-
1(c)(2)(iii) to increase to $250,000 the maximum amount of
property passing from a trust arrangement (including life
estates, remainders, estates for years and insurance and
annuity contracts) as a direct skip for which the executor is
responsible for filing the return and paying the GSTT. If
$250,000 or more of property passes as a direct skip, the
trustee or life insurance company must file the return and
pay the GSTT. The proposed regulations also amend Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 26.2601(b)(1)(v)(B)(2) to allow grandfathered
trusts to remain exempt from GSTT if a nongeneral power
of appointment is exercised and does not postpone or
suspend the vesting, ownership or power of alienation for
90 years after the creation of the trust. The temporary
regulations had allowed exemption only for nongeneral
powers of appointment which postponed vesting for more
than 21 years after a life in being at the creation of the trust.
57 Fed. Reg. 61355 (Dec. 24, 1992).
The IRS has issued proposed regulations implementing
several aspects of GSTT. The proposed regulations provide
that no automatic allocation of the $1 million GSTT
exemption will be made to trusts which will have a new
transferor before any GST will occur, e.g. a reverse QTIP
election. Allocation of the exemption, either by the executor
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or automatically, to a trust must be made to the entire trust
principal and not to any specific trust asset. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 26.2632-1.
The proposed regulations provide that when a GSTT
exemption is allocated to a lifetime transfer on a late filed
Form 709, the transferor may elect to value the property at
the fair market value as of the first day of the month of the
late allocation. However, the date of death value must be
used if the transfer occurs within 15 months of the
decedent's death or the fiduciary is required to fund the
payment with property fairly representative of the net
appreciation or depreciation occurring between the date of
death and the payment date. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
26 .2642-2 .
The proposed regulations provide the method for
recomputing the inclusion ratio for a trust for which an
additional transfer is made, for trusts consolidated with other
trusts, and for charitable lead annuity trusts. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 26.2642-1.
Under the proposed rules, a pecuniary amount payable
from a trust which is included in the transferor’s gross estate
may be treated as a separate trust if the pecuniary amount is
promptly funded. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1.
For reverse QTIP elections made for a trust prior to
December 24, 1992, the executor may elect to treat the trust
as two trusts, one with a zero inclusion ratio. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-2.
A beneficiary of a trust which allows the beneficiary a
right of withdrawal is treated as the transferor of the trust
property when the right of withdrawal expires, to the extent
the beneficiary is treated as making a transfer subject to gift
tax. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1.
The proposed regulations generally apply to generation-
skipping transfers occurring after December 24, 1992. 5 7
Fed. Reg. 61356 (Dec. 24, 1992).
The taxpayer transferred stock with an annual dividend of
$350,000 to trusts for grandchildren in exchange for debt
instruments for $1.5 million with interest payments of
$165,000. The trust beneficiaries had the right to require
withdrawal of annual contributions to the trusts subject to
the trustee’s right to delay payment if trust owned stock
would be required to make the distributions. The IRS ruled
that the GSTT $2 million exemption could not be applied
to the transfers because the taxpayer’s right to the interest
on the notes was a retained interest held by a person other
than the beneficiaries. The transfer was also not eligible for
the annual gift tax exclusion amount because the
beneficiaries’ right to withdraw trust contributions was
subject to the trustee’s right to delay such payments for ten
years. The IRS also ruled that the transferred property was
includible in the taxpayer’s gross estate because the taxpayer
retained an interest in the property through the interest
payments on the notes. Ltr. Rul. 9251004, Sept. 4 ,
1992 .
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE
TAX . The decedent owned all of the stock of two
corporations, a 50 percent interest in a partnership and an
undivided 50 percent interest in a commercial rental
property. The decedent personally or through the business
entities, managed the operation of rental properties owned
by the entitles and the decedent, including maintenance,
hiring employees, preparing properties for tenants,
obtaining new tenants and maintaining good tenant
relations. The IRS ruled that the decedent’s interests in the
properties and entities were interests in closely held
businesses for purposes of installment payment of estate
tax.  The IRS also ruled that cash accounts maintained by
the entities for working capital for tax and repair payments
were not passive assets and were includible in the decedent’s
closely held business amount. Ltr. Rul. 9250022 ,
Sept. 11, 1992.
IRA. The taxpayer was the designated beneficiary of an
IRA in the name of the decedent. The taxpayer transferred
the IRA to another custodian but maintained the IRA under
the name of the decedent and with the same schedule of
payments. The IRS ruled that the transfer was not subject to
tax. Ltr. Rul. 9250041, Sept. 17, 1992.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. Although the surviving
spouse and decedent had signed an antenuptial agreement
limiting the amount of the decedent’s property passing to
the spouse, the surviving spouse challenged the agreement
and sought the statutory one-third share of the decedent’s
estate. In settlement of the surviving spouse’s claim, the
one-third share was placed in a trust for life and the spouse
received a life estate in the homestead. The IRS ruled that
the present value, based on the life expectancy of the
surviving spouse, of the trust and the life estate in the
homestead was eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr.
Rul. 9251002, Aug. 27, 1992.
The decedent’s will bequeathed property to the surviving
spouse, children and grandchildren, with remainders to the
great grandchildren. All of the descendants disclaimed their
shares of the decedent’s estate such that the entire estate
passed to the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were qualified and the property passing to the
surviving spouse was eligible for the marital deduction.
Ltr. Rul. 9251019, Sept. 18, 1992.
PRIORITY. In administering the decedent's estate, the
executor successfully litigated the qualification of an
unfunded trust as the decedent's will. The executor claimed
as administrative expenses (1) an executor's fee, (2) money
advanced to the estate to pay an estate debt, and (3)
attorney's fees for the probate court and tax litigation. The
executor sought priority of the administrative expenses over
a federal tax claim against the estate for unpaid taxes owed
by the decedent. The court held that under 31 U.S.C. §
3713, the administrative expenses were entitled to priority
over the federal tax claims. Est. of Capato v. U . S . ,





ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The IRS has
adopted as final regulations amending the rules for
determining adjusted current earnings for purposes of
determining the alternative minimum tax for corporations.   
57 Fed. Reg. 60474 (Dec. 21, 1992).
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    BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS. In completing a redemption
of the corporate taxpayer's stock from an ESOP, the
corporation borrowed the funds used to purchase the stock.
The corporation claimed the loan fees and expenses as
business deductions. The court held that under I.R.C. §
162(k), the fees and expenses were not deductible because
they were incurred as part of a stock redemption. In re
Kroy (Europe) Ltd., Kroy, Inc., 92-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,611 (D. Ariz. 1992), rev'g ,
92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,146 (Bankr. D .
Ariz. 1992).
DEPRECIATION. As reported in Vol. 3 Agric. L.
Digest p. 186, the IRS adopted as final regulations
governing the applicable conventions under the accelerated
cost recovery system. One change in the final regulations
should be noted. The proposed regulations allowed a
depreciation deduction for mid-quarter property placed in
service and disposed of in the same taxable year. The final
regulations provide that all depreciable property placed in
service and disposed of in the same taxable year is not
eligible for a depreciation deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-
1(b)((ii). 57 Fed. Reg. 48980 (Oct. 29, 1992).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  The IRS
has adopted as final regulations providing that the acquisi-
tion of indebtedness by a person related to the debtor from a
person who is not related to the debtor results in discharge
of indebtedness income to the debtor based on the cost of
acquiring the indebtedness at the time it was acquired by the
related person. The proposed regulations had based the
amount of discharge of indebtedness on the fair market value
of the indebtedness at the time the indebtedness was
acquired. The final regulations apply the fair market standard
if the debtor acquired the indebtedness six months or more
before acquisition of the indebtedness by a related person or
if the purpose of the acquisition is the avoidance of tax.
Under the proposed regulations, the basic rule also
applied where the creditor became related to the debtor, if (1)
the creditor acquired the indebtedness less than six months
before becoming related to the debtor, or (2) on the day the
creditor became related to the debtor, the indebtedness of the
debtor represented more than 25 percent of the fair market
value of the creditor's assets or the assets of all persons
related to the debtor after the creditor becomes related to the
debtor.  In addition, if the creditor acquired the indebtedness
between 6 and 24 months before becoming related to the
debtor, the rule applied unless the creditor could demonstrate
that the indebtedness was not acquired in anticipation of the
creditor becoming related to the debtor. The final regulations
remove the six to 24 month test and the 25 percent test and
base the relatedness of the creditor on the facts and
circumstances of the acquisition. However, the final
regulations require disclosure of the facts and circumstances
if either of the two tests is met.
The rule does not apply to indebtedness (1) acquired by
the debtor and with a maturity date within one year of the
indebtedness being acquired by a related person, if the
indebtedness is retired on that date, or (2) acquired by a dealer
of securities in the ordinary course of business.  57 Fed.
Reg. 61805 (Dec. 29, 1992), adding Treas. R e g .
§ 1.108-2.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS.  The IRS has adopted as
final regulations governing the exclusion of working
condition fringe benefits excludible from income for
governmental employees and volunteers for governmental
units.
The final regulations also amend the rules for special
valuation of employer provided fringe benefits. Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-21(c)  The final regulations remove the
requirement that an employer inform an employee that the
special valuation election has been made by the employer.
The final regulations require at least one of the following
conditions for use of the special valuation election:
(1) the employer treats the value of the benefit as wages;
(2) the employee includes the value of the benefit in
income;
(3) the employee is not a "control" employee; or
(4) the employer demonstrates a good faith effort to treat
the benefit correctly for reporting purposes.
An employee may use a special valuation rule not used by
the employer if none of the four conditions is met.  5 7
Fed. Reg. 62192 (Dec. 30, 1992).
EXPENSE METHOD DEPRECIATION. The
IRS has adopted as final regulations involving the
limitations on the amount of expense method depreciation
allowable. The proposed regulations were discussed in Harl,
"Expense Method Depreciation," 2 Agric. L. Dig. 69
(1991), and only the changes made by the final regulations
are noted here. For purposes of the taxable income limit on
the amount of expense method depreciation, the final
regulations:
(1) include in the taxable income of an employee any
unreimbursed employee business expenses;
(2) include in a partnership's net income from a trade or
business all I.R.C. § 702 partnership items other
than credits, tax-exempt income and guaranteed
payments
(3) include in an S corporation's net income all S
corporation items under I.R.C. § 1366(a) other than
credits, tax-exempt income and compensation paid to
shareholder-employees; and
(4) exclude from the income limit any deduction
suspended by the I.R.C.
57 Fed. Reg. 61313 (Dec. 24, 1992) . Note: copies
of Dr. Harl's article may be ordered for $2.00 from
Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI
53705.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION. The standard mileage rate
for 1993 remains at 28 cents per mile for business use, 12
cents per mile for charitable use and 9 cents per mile for
medical and moving use. The depreciation rate remains at
11.5 cents per mile. Rev. Proc. 92-104, I .R.B.
1992-52, 24.
MINORS. The taxpayer was a minor child under the
age of 14 with both parents living. The taxpayer had
unearned income resulting from investment of settlement
proceeds from a personal injury suit. The taxpayer argued
that taxation, under I.R.C. § 1(g), of the unearned income at
the highest marginal rate of the parents was unconstitutional
for lack of due process. The court held that the statute was
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constitutional as applied in this case. Butler v. U . S . ,
798 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENT. The IRS sent a
final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) to a
general partner, a corporation, of the partnership even
though another individual had been named as tax matters
partner. The court held that the FPAA was not invalid.
Holstein ET IV, Ltd. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1992-716 .
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. For taxable years
1987 and 1988, the taxpayer was an employee of a company
which managed the development, construction and leasing of
rental properties owned by partnerships of which the
taxpayer was a partner. The taxpayer materially participated
in the preconstruction and development activities. The IRS
ruled that under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T(p), the
taxpayer’s share of partnership loss from the preconstruction
and development activities was not a passive loss, even
though the final activity, the rental of the properties, was a
passive activity for the partnerships. Ltr. R u l .
9252003, Aug. 31, 1992.
PENSION PLANS . The taxpayer was an employee
and sole shareholder of a professional corporation. The
taxpayer disolved the corporation and received all of the
assets, including distributions from pension and profit
sharing plans, but continued the business as a sole
proprietor. The taxpayer elected the 10-year averaging
method of the reporting of the gain from the plans'
distributions. The court held that the termination of the
corporation was not a separation of service allowing use of
the 10-year averaging method where the taxpayer continued
the business. Burton v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. No. 3 2
(1992) .
RETURNS. The IRS has issued revised rules as to the
obligations of participants in the electronic filing program.
Rev. Proc. 93-8, I.R.B. 1993-2.
S CORPORATIONS
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. A corporation
owned a shopping center and was a general partner in a
partnership which owned another shopping center. The
corporation hired an agent to provide various business
services for the tenants and the corporation also provided
business services. Although the services were included in
the rent, the compensation for the services constituted a
material part of the rent. The IRS ruled that the amounts
received as rent were not passive investment income for the
purpose of qualifying the corporation for the S corporation
election. Ltr. Rul. 9250011, Sept. 4, 1992).
RE-ELECTION. The corporation made an S corporation
election effective for the tax year beginning on January 1,
1989 but filed a revocation on January 24, 1989, which was
determined to be effective as of January 1, 1989. The IRS
ruled that the corporation could make an S corporation
election effective January 1, 1992. Ltr. Rul. 9251025 ,
Sept. 18, 1992.
PARTNERSHIP
JOINT VENTURE. The plaintiff sued for payment
for delivered hay. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was
a joint venturer with a third party in the buying, hauling and
selling of hay. The defendant and a third party negotiated the
hay purchase contracts, both persons supplied labor and
equipment to the business, and the profits and losses were
shared 60/40. The court held that the operation was a joint
adventure and that the defendant was liable for the unpaid
hay. Hill v. Zimmerer, 839 P.2d 977 (Wyo.
1992) .
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
SEEDS. The plaintiff purchased watermelon seeds from
separate defendants. The seeds grew well enough until the
plants developed a blotch which eventually destroyed most
of the crop. The plaintiff alleged that the seed was produced
on infected fields and sued for breach of implied and express
warranties, strict liability and negligence. The court ruled
that the first defendant was not liable for breach of express
warranty in that the seed containers only promised that the
seed would have "high vitality, vigor and germination," all
of which were met. The court ruled that an issue of fact
remained as to the other defendant in that the seed containers
promised that the seeds were “strictly high grade seeds”
which would amount to an express warranty if watermelon
seeds were commonly graded.  The court held that an issue
of fact was raised as to whether the terms “properly fitted for
seeding purposes” meant only that the seeds were warranted
to be watermelon seeds and not that the seeds were free of
disease. The first defendant was held to have effectively
disclaimed any implied warranties through conspicuous
placement on the seed containers of a specific disclaimer of
implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a
particular purpose. The second defendant was relieved of any
implied warranties because of an established industry
practice to limit liability to the cost of the seeds. The court
held that this rule applied even where the purchaser had no
knowledge of the industry practice.  The court denied
summary judgment for the defendants on the strict liability
claim because an issue remained as to whether the disease
caused “sudden” damages. Summary judgment for the
defendants was allowed as to the negligence claim because
the plaintiff failed to provide any substantive proof that the
seeds were negligently harvested by the defendants. Martin
Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 601 N . E .
2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
STATE REGULATION
OF AGRICULTURE
MILK. The Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board
established a $1.05 per hundredweight “add-on” to the price
of Class I milk for 1991-1992. The plaintiff challenged the
“add-on” as beyond the board’s authority. The court held that
under Penn. Stat. § 700j-801, the board had broad discretion
to set milk prices and because the “add-on” had an expiration
date, the price increase was subject to review within a
reasonable time. Finucane v. Pennsylvania Mi lk






PSEUDORABIES. The plaintiff lost a substantial
number of pigs to pseudorabies. The plaintiff learned that
several swine herds in the same county had been quarantined
for pseudorabies infections but that no public notice of the
quarantines was made by the state Department of
Agriculture. The plaintiff sued the state for failing to give
public notice of the pseudorabies outbreak. The Nebraska
Department of Agriculture had a policy of informing
veterinarians of pseudorabies quarantines but no policy of
informing the public. The court held that the statute, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 54-701, vesting power in the Department of
Agriculture to control infectious diseases in livestock did
not require public notice of infectious disease outbreaks;
therefore, such notice was a discretionary function. The
court also held that under the state Tort Claims Act, the
state may not be sued for claims based upon discretionary
functions. Blitzkie v. State, 491 N.W.2d 42 (Neb.
1992) .
WATER RIGHTS
APPURTENANCE TO LAND. The parents of the
plaintiff filed for water use rights on their farm land. Prior
to issuance of the certificate of appropriation, the parents
conveyed the land with all appurtenances to their children in
equal shares, with the plaintiff receiving a one-fifth interest.
After the certificate was issued, the children reconveyed the
parcels to each other in different shares and some conveyed
their property to the defendants. The plaintiff argued that the
water right passed in the first conveyance of the parents
because appropriation had been demonstrated, although the
certificate had not yet been issued. The court held that a
water right cannot pass as an appurtenance to land until the
certificate has been issued. Little v. Greene & Weed
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